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Abstract 129 
Understanding how people rate their confidence is critical for characterizing a wide range of 130 
perceptual, memory, motor, and cognitive processes. To enable the continued exploration of these 131 
processes, we created a large database of confidence studies spanning a broad set of paradigms, 132 
participant populations, and fields of study. The data from each study are structured in a common, 133 
easy-to-use format that can be easily imported and analyzed in multiple software packages. Each 134 
dataset is further accompanied by an explanation regarding the nature of the collected data. At the 135 
time of publication, the Confidence Database (available at osf.io/s46pr) contained 145 datasets 136 
with data from over 8,700 participants and almost 4 million trials. The database will remain open 137 
for new submissions indefinitely and is expected to continue to grow. We show the usefulness of 138 
this large collection of datasets in four different analyses that provide precise estimation for several 139 
foundational confidence-related effects. 140 
  141 
Main 142 
Researchers from a wide range of fields use ratings of confidence to provide fundamental insights 143 
about the mind. Confidence ratings are subjective ratings regarding one's first-order task 144 
performance. For instance, participants may first decide whether a probe stimulus belongs to a 145 
previously learned study list or not. A confidence rating, in this case, could involve the participants' 146 
second-order judgment regarding how sure they are about the accuracy of the decision made in that 147 
trial (i.e., accuracy of the first-order task performance). Such second-order judgments reflect people's 148 
ability to introspect and can be dissociated from the first-order judgment1. Confidence ratings tend to 149 
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correlate strongly with accuracy, response speed, and brain activity distinguishing old and new 150 
probes2 suggesting that they reflect relevant internal states.  151 
  152 
The question of how humans (or other animals) evaluate their own decisions has always been an 153 
important topic in psychology, and the use of confidence ratings dates back to the early days of 154 
experimental psychology3. In addition, confidence has been used as a tool to, among many other 155 
things, determine the number of distinct memory retrieval processes4, reveal distortions of visual 156 
awareness5, understand the factors that guide learning6, assess the reliability of eyewitness 157 
testimony7, test theories of sensory processing8 and decision-making9,10, help estimate the fit of 158 
parameters of the psychometric function more efficiently11, and characterize various psychiatric 159 
conditions12. The wide application of confidence makes it a fundamental measure in psychological 160 
research.  161 
  162 
However, despite the widespread use of confidence ratings, scientific progress has been slowed by 163 
the traditional unavailability of previously collected data. In the current system, testing a new idea 164 
often requires scientists to spend months or years gathering the relevant data. The substantial cost in 165 
time and money associated with new data collection has undoubtedly led to many new ideas simply 166 
being abandoned without ever being examined empirically. This is especially unfortunate given that 167 
these ideas could likely have been tested using the dozens of datasets already collected by other 168 
scientists.  169 
  170 
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Typically, when data re-use takes place, it is within a lab or a small scientific group -- that often 171 
restricts itself to very specific paradigms -- which potentially limits the formation of a broader 172 
understanding of confidence across a wider range of tasks and participants. Therefore, another 173 
important advantage of data re-use lies in the diversity of experimental tasks, set-ups, and 174 
participants offered by compiling datasets from different labs and different populations. 175 
  176 
Although data sharing can speed up scientific progress considerably, fields devoted to understanding 177 
human behavior unfortunately have cultures of not sharing data13,14. For example, Wicherts et al.15 178 
documented their painstaking and ultimately unsuccessful endeavor to obtain behavioral data for re-179 
analysis; despite persistent efforts, the authors were able to obtain just 25.7% of datasets the authors 180 
claimed to be available for re-analysis. Nevertheless, recent efforts towards increased openness have 181 
started to shift the culture considerably and more and more authors post their data in online 182 
depositories16,17. 183 
  184 
There are, however, several challenges involved in secondary analyses of data, even when such data 185 
have been made freely available. First, the file type may not be usable or clear for some researchers. 186 
For example, sharing files in proprietary formats may limit other researcher’s ability to access them 187 
(e.g., if reading the file requires software that is not freely or easily obtainable). Second, even if the 188 
data can be readily imported and used, important information about the data may not have been 189 
included. Third, researchers who need data from a large number of studies have to spend a 190 
considerable amount of time finding individual datasets, familiarizing themselves with how each 191 
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dataset is structured, and organizing all datasets into a common format for analysis. Finally, given the 192 
size of the literature, it can be difficult to even determine which papers contain relevant data. 193 
  194 
Here we report on a large-scale effort to create a database of confidence studies that addresses all of 195 
the problems above. The database uses an open standardized format (.csv files) that can easily be 196 
imported into any software program used for analysis. The individual datasets are formatted using 197 
the same general set of guidelines making it less likely that critical components of the datasets are 198 
not included and ensuring that data re-use is much less time-consuming. Finally, creating a single 199 
collection of confidence datasets makes it much easier and faster to find datasets that could be re-200 
used to test new ideas or models. 201 
  202 
Details on the database 203 
The Confidence Database is hosted on the Open Science Framework (OSF) website (osf.io/s46pr). 204 
Each dataset is represented by two files – a data file in .csv format and a readme file in .txt format. 205 
  206 
The majority of data files contain the following fields: participant index, stimulus, response, 207 
confidence, response time of the decision, and response time of the confidence rating. Depending on 208 
the specific design of each study, these fields can be slightly different (e.g., if there are two stimuli on 209 
each trial or confidence and decision are given with a single button press). Further, many datasets 210 
include additional fields needed to fully describe the nature of the collected data. 211 
  212 
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The readme files contain essential information about the contributor, corresponding published paper 213 
(if the dataset is published and current status of the project if not), stimuli used, confidence scale, and 214 
experimental manipulations. Other information such as the original purpose of the study, the main 215 
findings, the location of data collection, etc. are also often included. In general, the readme files 216 
provide a quick reference regarding the nature of each dataset and mention details that could be 217 
needed for future re-analyses. 218 
  219 
The Confidence Database includes a wide variety of studies. Individual datasets recruit different 220 
populations (e.g., healthy or patient populations), focus on different fields of study (e.g., perception, 221 
memory, motor control, decision making), employ different confidence scales (e.g., binary, n-point 222 
scales, continuous scales, wagering), use different types of tasks (e.g., binary judgements vs. 223 
continuous estimation tasks), and collect confidence at different times (e.g., after or simultaneous 224 
with the decision). Figure 1 gives a broad overview of the types of datasets included in the database 225 
at the time of publication. This variety ensures that future re-analyses can address a large number of 226 
scientific questions and test them based on multiple methods of evaluating one’s own primary task 227 
performance. 228 
 229 
Importantly, the database will remain open for new submissions indefinitely. Instructions for new 230 
submissions are made available on the OSF page of the database. Carefully formatted .csv and .txt 231 
files that follow the submission instructions can be e-mailed to confidence.database@gmail.com. 232 
They will be checked for quality and then uploaded with the rest of the database. 233 
 234 
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Finally, to facilitate searching the database, a spreadsheet with basic information regarding each 235 
study will be maintained (link can be found on the OSF page). The spreadsheet includes information 236 
about a number of different details regarding the dataset such as the field of study (e.g., perception, 237 
memory, etc.), authors, corresponding publication, number of participants and trials, the type of 238 
confidence scale, etc. 239 
  240 
At the time of publication, the Confidence Database contained 145 datasets, bringing together 8,787 241 
participants, for a total of 3,955,802 individual trials. The data were collected mostly in laboratory 242 
experiments (from 18 different countries over five continents) but also in online experiments. Despite 243 
its already large size, the database still contains only a small fraction of the available data on 244 
confidence and is expected to continue to grow. We encourage researchers who already make their 245 
data available to also submit their data to the Confidence Database. This would make their data 246 
easier to discover and re-use, and would multiply the impact of their research. 247 
 248 
Anyone is encouraged to download and re-use the data from the database. The database is shared 249 
under the most permissive CC0 license thus placing the data in the public domain. As with the re-use 250 
of any other data, publications that result from such re-analysis should cite the current paper, as well 251 
as the listed citation for each of the datasets that were re-analyzed. We highly encourage the 252 
preregistration of future secondary analyses and refer readers who wish to perform such analyses to 253 
an excellent discussion of this process including preregistration templates by Weston et al.18 (the 254 
templates are available at osf.io/x4gzt). 255 
 256 
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Example uses of the Confidence Database 257 
The Confidence Database can be used for a variety of purposes such as developing and testing new 258 
models of confidence generation; comparing confidence across different cognitive domains, rating 259 
scales, and populations; determining the nature of metacognitive deficits that accompany psychiatric 260 
disorders; characterizing the relationship between confidence, accuracy, and response times; and 261 
building theories of the response times associated with confidence ratings. Further, the database can 262 
also be used to test hypotheses unrelated to confidence due to the inclusion of choice, accuracy, and 263 
response time. Different studies can re-use a few relevant datasets (maybe even a single one) or 264 
simultaneously analyze a large set of the available datasets thus achieving substantially higher power 265 
than typical individual studies. 266 
 267 
Below we present results from four different example analyses in order to demonstrate the potential 268 
utility and versatility of the database. These analyses are designed to take advantage of a large 269 
proportion of the available data, thus resulting in very large sample sizes. Annotated codes for 270 
running these analyses are freely available at the OSF page of the database (osf.io/s46pr). We note 271 
that these codes can be used by researchers as a starting point for future analyses. All statistical tests 272 
are two-tailed and their assumptions were verified. Measurements were taken from distinct samples. 273 
 274 
Analysis 1: How confidence is related to choice and confidence response times (RTs) 275 
One of the best known properties of confidence ratings is that they correlate negatively with choice 276 
RT2. However, despite its importance, this finding is virtually always treated as the outcome of a 277 
binary null-hypothesis significance test, which does not reveal the strength of the effect. At the same 278 
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time, it is becoming widely recognized that building a replicable quantitative science requires that 279 
researchers, among other things, “adopt estimation thinking and avoid dichotomous thinking”19. 280 
Precise estimation, though, requires very large sample sizes and any individual study is usually not 281 
large enough to allow for accuracy in estimation. The Confidence Database thus provides a unique 282 
opportunity to estimate with unprecedented precision the strength of foundational effects such as 283 
the negative correlation between confidence and choice RT, thus informing theories that rely on 284 
these effects. Further, the database allows for investigations of lesser studied relationships such as 285 
between confidence and confidence RT. 286 
 287 
Using the data from the Confidence Database, we thus investigated the precise strength of the 288 
correlation of confidence with both choice and confidence RT. We first selected all datasets where 289 
choice and confidence RTs were reported. Note that some datasets featured designs where the 290 
choice and confidence were made with a single button press -- such datasets were excluded from the 291 
current analyses. In addition, we excluded individual participants who only used a single level of 292 
confidence because it is impossible to correlate confidence and RT for such subjects, and participants 293 
for whom more than 90% of the data were excluded (which occurred for six participants from a study 294 
with very high confidence RTs; see below). In total, the final analyses were based on 4,089 295 
participants from 76 different datasets. 296 
 297 
Before conducting the main analyses, we performed basic data cleanup. This step is important as 298 
contributors are encouraged to include all participants and trials from an experiment even if some 299 
participants or trials were excluded from data analyses in the original publications. Specifically, we 300 
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excluded all trials without a confidence rating (such trials typically came from studies that included a 301 
deadline for the confidence response), all trials without choice RT (typically due to a deadline on the 302 
main decision), and all trials with confidence and/or choice RTs slower than 5 seconds (the results 303 
remained very similar if a threshold of 3 or 10 seconds was used instead). These exclusion criteria 304 
resulted in removing 7.3% of the data. In addition, for each participant, we excluded all choice and 305 
confidence RTs differing by more than 3 standard deviations from the mean (resulting in the removal 306 
of additional 1.8% of the data). 307 
 308 
We then correlated, for each participant, the confidence ratings with choice RTs. We found that the 309 
average correlation across participants was r = -.24 (t(4088) = -71.09, p < 2.2e-16, d = 1.11). The very 310 
large sample size allowed us to estimate the average correlation with a very high degree of precision: 311 
the 99.9% confidence interval for the average correlation value was [-.25, -.23], which should be 312 
considered as a medium-to-large effect20. At the same time, it is important to emphasize that the high 313 
precision in estimating the average correlation does not imply a lack of variability between individual 314 
participants. Indeed, we observed very high individual variability (SD = .21), which we visualize by 315 
plotting all individual correlation values and corresponding density functions in the form of raincloud 316 
plots21 (Figure 2A). Still, the effect size is large enough that power analyses indicate that a sample size 317 
as small as N=9 provides >80% power and a sample size of N=13 provides >95% power to detect this 318 
effect (at α = .05). 319 
 320 
We next performed the same analyses for the correlation between confidence and confidence RT. We 321 
found that the average correlation across participants was r = -.07, SD = .24 (t(4088) = -18.77, p < 322 
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2.2e-16, d = .29) with a 99.9% confidence interval for the average correlation value of [-.08, -.06]. This 323 
effect should be considered as “very small for the explanation of single events but potentially 324 
consequential in the not-very-long run”20. The small but reliable negative association between 325 
confidence and confidence RT would have been particularly difficult to detect with a small sample 326 
size. Indeed, a study with a sample size of 33 (the median sample size of the studies in the Confidence 327 
Database) would have only 37% power of detecting this effect. To achieve power of 80%, one 328 
requires a sample size of N=93; for power of 95%, N=152 is needed.  329 
 330 
It should be noted that existing models of confidence generation (e.g. 22) predict a lack of any 331 
association between confidence and confidence RT (but see 23). The small but reliable negative 332 
correlation thus raises the question about what is causing this negative association. One possibility is 333 
that participants are faster to give high confidence ratings because a strong decision-related signal 334 
can propagate faster to neural circuits that generate the confidence response (for a similar argument 335 
in the case of attention, see 24) but further research is needed to directly test this hypothesis.  336 
 337 
Finally, we also found that the strength of the correlation between confidence and confidence RT was 338 
itself correlated with the strength of the correlation between confidence and choice RT, r(4087) = .20, 339 
p < 2.2e-16 (Figure 2B). Future research should investigate whether this correlation is due to 340 
variability in individual participants or variability at the level of the datasets.  341 
 342 
Analysis 2: Serial dependence in confidence RT 343 
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It is well known that perceptual choices25, confidence judgments26, and choice RTs27 are subject to 344 
serial dependence. Such findings have been used to make fundamental claims about the nature of 345 
perceptual processing such as that the visual system forms a “continuity field” over space and 346 
time28,29. The presence of serial dependence can thus help reveal the underlying mechanisms of 347 
perception and cognition. However, to the best of our knowledge, the presence of serial dependence 348 
has never been investigated for one of the most important components of confidence generation: 349 
confidence RT. Therefore, determining whether serial dependence exists for confidence, and if so, 350 
estimating precisely its effect size, can therefore provide important insight about the nature of 351 
confidence generation. 352 
 353 
To address this question, we considered the data from the Confidence Database. We analyzed all 354 
datasets in which confidence was provided with a separate button press from the primary decision 355 
and that reported confidence RT. In total, 82 datasets were included, comprising 4,474 participants. 356 
Data cleanup was performed as in the previous analysis. Specifically, we removed all trials without 357 
confidence RT and all trials with confidence RT slower than 5 seconds (results remained very similar if 358 
a threshold of 3 or 10 seconds was used instead), both on the current trial and up to seven trials back, 359 
because we wanted to investigate serial dependence up to lag-7 (this excluded a total of 4.3% of the 360 
data). Further, as before, we excluded, separately for each participant, all confidence RTs differing by 361 
more than 3 standard deviations from the mean (thus excluding additional 9.6% of the data).  362 
 363 
We performed a mixed regression analysis predicting confidence RT with fixed effects for the recent 364 
trial history up to seven trials back25 and random intercepts for each participant. Degrees of freedom 365 
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were estimated using Satterthwaite’s approximation, as implemented in the lmerTest package30. We 366 
found evidence for strong autocorrelation in confidence RT. Specifically, there was a very large lag-1 367 
autocorrelation (b = 1.346, t(1299601) = 153.6, p < 2.2e-16; Figure 3). The strength of the 368 
autocorrelation dropped sharply for higher lags but remained significantly positive until at least lag-7 369 
(all p’s < 2.2e-16). 370 
 371 
These results suggest the existence of serial dependence in confidence RT. However, it remains 372 
unclear whether previous trials have a causal effect on the current trial. For example, some of the 373 
observed autocorrelation may be due to a general speed up of confidence RTs over the course of 374 
each experiment. To address this question, future studies should experimentally manipulate the 375 
speed of the confidence ratings on some trials and explore whether such manipulations affect the 376 
confidence RT on subsequent trials.   377 
 378 
Analysis 3: Negative metacognitive sensitivity 379 
Many studies have shown that humans and other animals have the metacognitive ability to use 380 
confidence ratings to judge the accuracy of their own decisions31. In other words, humans have 381 
positive metacognitive sensitivity32, meaning that higher levels of confidence predict better 382 
performance. However, it is not uncommon that individual participants fail to show the typically 383 
observed positive metacognitive sensitivity. Until now, such cases have been difficult to investigate 384 
because they occur infrequently within a given dataset.  385 
 386 
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Using the Confidence Database, we estimated the prevalence of negative metacognitive sensitivity 387 
and investigated its causes. We analyzed all datasets that contained the variables confidence and 388 
accuracy. In total, 71 datasets were included, comprising of 4,768 participants. We excluded studies 389 
on subjective difficulty, because these investigate the relation between confidence and performance 390 
within correct trials. We further excluded participants who only reported a single level of confidence 391 
(since it is impossible to estimate metacognitive sensitivity for such participants), studies with a 392 
continuous measure of accuracy, and participants for whom more than 90% of the data were 393 
excluded (which occurred for six participants from a study with very high confidence RTs). 394 
Metacognitive sensitivity was computed using a logistic regression predicting accuracy by normalized 395 
confidence ratings. This measure of metacognition has a number of undesirable properties32 but 396 
reliably indicates whether metacognitive sensitivity is positive or negative.  397 
 398 
We found that, across all participants, the average beta value from the logistic regression was .096, 399 
SD = .064, (t(4767) = 104.01, p < 2.2e-16, d = 1.5; Figure 4A), thus indicating that metacognitive 400 
sensitivity was reliably positive in the group. However, 293 of the participants (6.1% of all 401 
participants) had a negative beta value, indicating the potential presence of negative metacognitive 402 
sensitivity.  403 
 404 
We next explored why such negative coefficients may occur for these 293 participants. We reasoned 405 
that the majority of the cases of estimated negative metacognitive sensitivity could be due to several 406 
factors unrelated to the true metacognitive sensitivity of each participant. First, the negative beta 407 
values could simply be due to misestimation stemming from relatively small sample sizes. Even 408 
 17
though the number of trials per participant did not correlate with participants’ beta coefficient 409 
(r(4766) = -.021, p = .143; Figure 4B), 9.9% of all participants with negative beta value completed less 410 
than 50 trials in total. Second, a positive relationship between confidence and accuracy can be 411 
expected only if performance is above chance (if performance is at chance, this may indicate that 412 
there is no reliable signal that could be used by the metacognitive system, although see 33,34). We did 413 
indeed observe a correlation between the beta values and average accuracy (r(4766) = .203, p < 2.2e-414 
16, Figure 4C) with 19.4% of all participants with negative beta values having an accuracy of less than 415 
55%. Third, for those datasets including choice RT or confidence RT, we calculated the overall median 416 
choice/confidence RTs and correlated these with the beta coefficients (one dataset was excluded 417 
here, because the primary task was to complete Raven's progressive matrices and therefore choice 418 
and confidence RTs were within the range of minutes rather than seconds). Again, we observed 419 
significant correlations between betas and choice RTs (r(3076) = -.083, p = 3.6e-06, Figure 4D) and 420 
between betas and confidence RTs (r(2191) = .071, p = 0.0009, Figure 4E), but the magnitude of these 421 
correlations was very small and only 2.3% and 2.4% of participants with negative betas had median 422 
choice or confidence RT of less than 200 ms, respectively. Finally, we reasoned that beta coefficients 423 
could be misestimated if a very large proportion of confidence judgments were the same. Therefore, 424 
we computed the proportion of the most common confidence rating for each participant (M=37.9%, 425 
SD = .22). We did not observe a significant correlation between the proportion of the most common 426 
confidence rating and the beta values (r(4766) = -.025, p = .086, Figure 4F), and only 5.4% of all 427 
participants with negative betas only used a single confidence rating for more than 95% of the time. 428 
 429 
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Overall, 96 participants from the 293 with negative beta values (32.7%) completed less than 50 trials, 430 
had overall accuracy of less than 55%, or used the same confidence response on more than 95% of all 431 
trials. This means that 197 participants had negative beta values despite the absence of any of these 432 
factors (note that for 55 of these participants, no RT information was provided, so a few of them 433 
could have had overly fast choice or confidence RT). This result raises the question about the 434 
underlying causes of the negative beta values. Follow-up studies could focus on these subjects and 435 
determine whether there is anything different about them or the tasks that they completed. 436 
 437 
Analysis 4: Confidence scales used in perception and memory studies 438 
One of the strengths of the Confidence Database is that it allows for investigations on how specific 439 
effects depend on factors that differ from study to study. For example, for any of the analyses above, 440 
one could ask how the results depend on factors like the domain of study (i.e., perception, memory, 441 
cognitive, etc.), confidence scale used (e.g., n-point vs. continuous), whether confidence was 442 
provided simultaneously with the decision, the number of trials per participant, etc. These questions 443 
can reveal some of the mechanisms behind confidence generation, such as, for example, whether 444 
metacognition is a domain-specific or domain-general process35,36. 445 
 446 
Here we took advantage of this feature of the Confidence Database to ask a meta-science question: 447 
Does the type of confidence scale researchers use depend on the subfield that they work in? 448 
Confidence ratings are typically given in one of two ways. The majority of studies use a discrete Likert 449 
scale (e.g., a 4-point scale where 1 = lowest confidence, 4 = highest confidence). Such scales typically 450 
have a fixed stimulus-response mapping so that a given button always indicates the same level of 451 
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confidence (though variable stimulus-response mappings are still possible). Likert scales can also have 452 
different number of options. Comparatively fewer studies use continuous scales (e.g., a 0-100 scale 453 
where 0 = lowest confidence, 100 = highest confidence). Such scales typically do not have a fixed 454 
stimulus-response mapping and responses are often given using a mouse click rather than a button 455 
press (though it is possible to use a keyboard in such cases too). 456 
 457 
We focused on the domains of perception and memory because these were the only two domains 458 
with a sufficient number of datasets in the database (89 datasets for perception and 27 datasets for 459 
memory; all other domains had at most 16 datasets; see Figure 1). We categorized each dataset from 460 
these two domains as employing a 2-point, 3-point, 4-point, 5-point, 6-point, 7-to-11-point, or a 461 
continuous confidence scale (we combined the 7- to 11-point scales into a single category because of 462 
the low number of datasets with such scales). Finally, we computed the percent of datasets with each 463 
of the confidence scales separately for the perception and memory domains. 464 
 465 
We found that there were several systematic differences between the two domains. Most notably, 466 
memory studies used a 3-point confidence scale 48% of the time (13 out of 27 datasets), whereas 467 
perception studies used a 3-point confidence scale just 16% of the time (14 out of 89 datasets) with 468 
the difference in proportions being significant (Z = -3.49, p = 0.0005; Figure 5). On the other hand, a 469 
much lower percent of memory datasets (4%, 1 out of 27 datasets) used a continuous scale compared 470 
to perception studies (33%, 29 out of 89 datasets; Z = 3.002, p = 0.003). Both comparisons remained 471 
significant at the .05 level after Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons was applied. We did 472 
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not find any difference between perception and memory studies for the rest of the confidence scale 473 
types (all p’s > 0.2 before Bonferroni correction). 474 
 475 
These results suggest the presence of systematic differences in how confidence is collected in 476 
perception and memory studies with most pronounced differences in the use of 3-point and 477 
continuous scales. Since it is unclear why perception and memory research would benefit from the 478 
use of different confidence scales, these findings may point to a lack of sufficient cross-talk between 479 
the two fields. Future research should first confirm the presence of such differences using an 480 
unbiased sample of published studies and then trace the origin of these differences. 481 
 482 
Data sharing in the behavioral sciences 483 
It is a sad reality that “most of the data generated by humanity’s previous scientific endeavors is now 484 
irrecoverably lost”13. Data are lost due to outdated file formats; researchers changing universities, 485 
leaving academia, or becoming deceased; websites becoming defunct; and lack of interpretable 486 
metadata describing the raw data. It is unlikely that much of the data not already uploaded to 487 
websites dedicated to data preservation will remain available for future research several decades 488 
from now. 489 
  490 
We hope that the Confidence Database will contribute to substantially increased data preservation 491 
and serve as an example for similar databases in other subfields of behavioral science and beyond. 492 
Many subfields of psychology produce data that can be fully summarized in a single file using a 493 
common format and thus can be easily shared. The mere existence of such a database in a given field 494 
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may encourage data sharing by facilitating the process of preparing and uploading data; indeed lack 495 
of easy options for data sharing is among the important factors preventing researchers from sharing 496 
their data37,38. A popular database can also provide the benefit of the extra visibility afforded to the 497 
studies in it. Databases could serve as invaluable tools for meta-analyses and as a means to minimize 498 
false positive rates that may originate from low-powered studies and publication bias (i.e., favoring 499 
significant findings) by simply including datasets that also show null effects. Importantly, it is critical 500 
that sharing data is done ethically and that participant anonymity is not compromised39–41. We have 501 
followed these principles in assembling the Confidence Database: All datasets have received IRB 502 
approvals by the relevant local committees (these can be found in the original publications), all 503 
participants have provided informed consent, and all available data are de-identified. 504 
  505 
Facilitation of data sharing would benefit from determining the factors that prevent researchers from 506 
exercising this important practice as part of their dissemination efforts. One of these factors could be 507 
the notion that researchers who spent resources to collect the original dataset should have priority 508 
over others in re-using their own data37,42. We argue that sharing data can have positive 509 
consequences for individual researchers by increasing the visibility of their research, the citation 510 
rate43, and its accuracy by enabling meta-analysis. Another set of factors are those that deter 511 
researchers from using shared data in open repositories. One of those factors is the belief that 512 
utilizing shared data could limit the impact of the work. Milham et al.44 addressed such issues by 513 
demonstrating that manuscripts using shared data can, in fact, result in impactful papers in cognitive 514 
neuroscience and make a case for a more universal effort for data sharing. We hope the construction 515 
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and maintenance of the Confidence Database will help address some of these issues in the domain of 516 
confidence research. 517 
 518 
Finally, it is important to consider the limitations of the Confidence Database and similar future 519 
databases. First, the quality of such databases is determined by the quality of the individual studies; 520 
amassing large quantities of unreliable data would be of little use. Second, the datasets included are 521 
unlikely to be an unbiased sample of the literature (though the literature as a whole is unlikely to be 522 
an unbiased sample of all possible studies). Third, in standardizing the data format across various 523 
datasets, some of the richness of each dataset is lost. Therefore, in addition to contributing to field-524 
wide databases, we encourage researchers to also share their raw data in a separate repository. 525 
  526 
Conclusion 527 
The traditional unavailability of data in the behavioral sciences is beginning to change. An increasing 528 
number of funding agencies now require data sharing and individual researchers often post their data 529 
even in the absence of official mandates to do so. The Confidence Database represents a large-scale 530 
attempt to create a common database in a subfield of behavioral research. We believe that this effort 531 
will have a large and immediate effect on confidence research and will become the blueprint for 532 
many other field-specific databases.  533 
 534 
Data availability 535 
The Confidence Database is available at osf.io/s46pr. 536 
 537 
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Code availability 538 
Codes reproducing all analyses in this paper are available at osf.io/s46pr.  539 
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Figure legends 642 
Figure 1. Datasets currently in the Confidence Database. Pie charts showing the number of datasets 643 
split by category, publication year, number of participants, number of trials per participant, type of 644 
judgment, and rating scale. The label “Multiple” in the first pie chart indicates that the same 645 
participants completed tasks from more than one category. The maximum number of participants 646 
was 589 and the maximum trials per participant was 4,320 (“variable” indicates that different 647 
participants completed different number of trials). 648 
 649 
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Figure 2. Correlating confidence with choice and confidence RT. (A) We found a medium-to-large 650 
negative correlation (r = -.24, p < 2.2e-16, n = 4,089) between confidence and choice RT, as well as a 651 
small negative correlation (r = -.07, p < 2.2e-16, n = 4,089) between confidence and confidence RT. 652 
Box shows the median and the interquartile (25-75%) range, whereas the whiskers show the 2-98% 653 
range. (B) The strength of the two correlations in panel A were themselves correlated across subjects 654 
(r = .23, p < 2.2e-16, n = 4,089).  655 
 656 
Figure 3. Serial dependence in confidence RT. We observed a large lag-1 autocorrelation (b = 1.346, 657 
t(1299601) = 153.6, p < 2.2e-16, n = 4,474). The autocorrelation decreased for higher lags but 658 
remained significant up to lag-7 (all p’s < 2.2e-16, n = 4,474). Error bars indicate SEM. Individual 659 
datapoints are not shown because the plots are based on the results of a mixed model analysis. 660 
 661 
Figure 4. The prevalence of estimates of negative metacognitive sensitivity. (A) Individual beta 662 
values and beta values density plot for the observed relationship between confidence and accuracy. 663 
Box shows the median and the interquartile (25-75%) range, whereas the whiskers show the 2-98% 664 
range. (B-F) Scatter plots, including lines of best fit, for the relationships between the beta value for 665 
confidence-accuracy relationship and the number of trials (B), average accuracy (C), median choice RT 666 
(D), median confidence RT (E), and the proportion of trials where the most common confidence 667 
judgment was given (F).  668 
 669 
Figure 5. Confidence scale use for perception and memory studies. The percent of 2-point, 3-point, 670 
4-point, 5-point, 6-point, 7-to-11-point, and continuous confidence scales were plotted separately for 671 
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perception and memory datasets. We combined the 7- to 11-point scales because of the low number 672 
of datasets with such scales. The two domains differed in how often they employed 3-point and 673 
continuous scales. 674 
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